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A Brave New Lochner Era?
The
Constitutionality of NAFTA Chapter 11
ABSTRACT
In the eight years since its adoption, NAFTA Chapter 11
has escaped significantscrutiny from academics andjournalists
alike. However, with the recent filing of several Chapter 11
expropriation claims involving U.S. states, Chapter 11 has
begun to gain some notoriety in the press and sparked at least
two legal symposia this past year.
This Note begins by highlighting the recent Methanex
Chapter 11 claim involving the State of California. Methanex, a
Canadian chemical manufacturer and importer, claimed $1.6
billion in damages over California'sban of the chemical MTBE.
Despite the EPA'S classification of MTBE as a possible
carcinogenand an academic study that documented its presence
in over ten thousand groundwater sites, Methanex claimed that
California's ban "expropriated" their investment. Methanex
argued it is due just and timely compensationfor this purported
expropriation. Moreover, Chapter 11 disputes, by and large,
remaiL closed to public scrutiny because of the rule of
internationalinvestment arbitration.
It is not surprising that such claims sparked a modest
debate over the policy implicationsof Chapter11 and its dispute
resolution procedures. Though several critics note that many
Chapter 11 claims push the limits of credulity and that
adjudicationof these claims needs to occur in fora to which the
public has access, the threshold question of whether NAFTA
Chapter 11 is constitutional remains ignored. This Note argues
that Chapter 11 raises serious constitutional questions
concerning the Eleventh Amendment and Article I. With the
Supreme Court's renewed emphasis on federalism, it is far from
clear whether NAFTA Chapter 11 is constitutional.
At the outset, a word of caution is due to the reader. This
Note makes an important substance-over-form assumption by
assuming that the Eleventh Amendment is implicated.
Arguably, the Eleventh Amendment is never reached because the
United States, as signatory party of NAFTA, stands in as a
proxy for any U.S. state mired in a Chapter 11 dispute. If a
judgment is won involving a U.S. state, the judgment is
formally won against the United States. Though the United
States will then sue the state for the repayment of any judgment,
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arguably the Eleventh Amendment is never reached because the
state is never party to the original suit. Though such reasoning
is provocative in its own right, this Note assumes the Eleventh
Amendment is reached because the substance of such a suit is a
proceedingagainst the state qua state.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In his opening statement before the Senate Committee on
Environment and Public Works, Senator Howard Metzenbaum called
the factory and living conditions in Mexico "truly unbelievable."'
Metzenbaum then reeled off a litany of horribles, arguing that if
NAFTA permits American corporations to increase their profits by
standing on the backs of the Mexican poor and exploiting Mexico's
non-existent environmental enforcement it would be nothing short of
immoral.2 Billionaire Ross Perot echoed a far more practical concern
during the second and third debates of the 1992 Presidential
election.3 In perhaps the most notable quote of the entire campaign,
Perot warned that, if NAFTA passed, there would be "a giant sucking
sound of jobs being pulled out of this country."4
Both Metzenbaum's ideals and Perot's folksy prudence
summarize the two popular arguments attacking NAFTA during its
passage through Congress.5 However, both arguments ignore the
import of NAFTA Chapter 11 and what might be the most significant
evisceration of state police power since the Supreme Court freed the
states from Lochner's shackles in 1937.6 Labeled by several as an

1.
Economic and Environmental Implications of the Proposed U S. Trade
Agreement with Mexico: Joint Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Environment and
Public Works and the Subcomm. On Labor and Human Resources, 102nd Cong. (1991),
reprintedin 9 REAMS AND SCHULTZ, THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREE.,iEMEr, A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAW 103-82, Doc. 36 at 2 (1994).
2.
Id. Senator Metzenbaun specifically stated that,
the lure of low wages and little effective regulation have drawn hundreds of
U.S. companies to this area. U.S. corporations now employ a half a million
Mexicans in this region, some as young as 12 years old. These companies set
up shop and overwhelm the local infrastructure. Factory waste and chemical
residue pour into open canals which in turn irrigate crops .... Families live m
shacks constructed of cardboard boxes and packing crates .... Children eat
and sleep on dirt floors and drink rain water which is collected in discarded
chemical drums.. . . If this free trade agreement is at all based on the
maquiladora model and will simply expand these inhuman conditions
throughout Mexico, then our acceptance of this agreement would be nothing
short of immoral.
Id.
3.
David S. Broder & Ruth Marcus, Clinton, Bush, Perot Stich to Issues in
Debate, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 1992, at Al.
4.
David Jackson, Perot blasts trade pact in debate, Dallas Morning News,
Oct. 20, 1992, at 14A.
See, e.g., Trade Pact Signed; Foes Vow Protests Opponents say NAFTA will
5.
cost U.S. Workers Jobs, Ruin Environment, S.F. EXAIHNER, Dec. 17, 1992, at Dl; see
also ProtestsPredictedifNAFTA Approed, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 17, 1992, at A5.
6.
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state
minimum wage law for women and, more importantly, establishing the rational basis
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"obscure clause," 7 NAFTA Chapter 11 hamstrings traditional state
police power actions by providing foreign investors with a secret
forum where significant monetary relief can be sought under a theory
that state action indirectly "expropriated" their investment.8
Under Chapter 11, a domestic corporation of any NAFTA country
can challenge any government action of the other participating states

under the broad and vaguely defined rubric of "expropriation."9
Methanex, a Canadian producer of methyl tertiary butyl ether
(MTBE), recently utilized this mechanism to challenge California's
regulatory ban of MTBE. On March 25, 1999, California Governor
Gray Davis issued an executive order banning the use of MTBE for
gasoline.' 0 MTBE had long been placed on the EPA's list of possible
carcinogens and, according to a University of California-Davis study,
it was found in over ten thousand groundwater sites.1 Within three
months, Methanex, a Canadian Producer of MTBE, submitted a
Notice of Intent to the United States NAFTA office claiming that
California "expropriated" its investment in violation of Chapter 11.12
Methanex requested damages of approximately $1.6 billion.
Utilizing Chapter l's dispute resolution mechanism, Methanex
forced California's action to be reviewed by an international
arbitration panel rather than an Article III or state court. 13 Because
the stakes are high for California, international arbitration
unpredictable, and international law on indirect takings remains

standard of review for State legislative acts which overruled the Lochner standard and
its progeny). Of the 20 volumes cataloguing NAFTA's legislative history there is
virtually no mention of Chapter 11. See generallyREAMS AND SCHULTZ, supra note 1.

7.

Mathew Nolan and Darin Lippoldt, Obscure NAFTA Clause Empowers

Private Parties, Investor-Protection Clause Lets Companies Haul Signatories into
Arbitrationfor Violation of Pact, NAVL L.J., Apr. 6, 1998, at B.
8.
J. Martin Wagner, International Investment, Expropriation and
Environmental Protection, 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 465 (1999); Robert W. Benson,
Free Trade as an Extremist Ideology: The Case of NAFTA, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
555 (1994).
9.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
10.
Julia Ferguson, California Concerned about Contaminated Water:
Canadian CorporationFiles NAFTA Expropriation Claim Against U.S., 1999 COLO. J
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 65 (2000).
11.
Id. Ferguson does note that the degree of danger that MTBE poses is
debatable. The EPA has listed it as only a "potential" human carcinogen because
exposure to MTBE has been linked to tumors and nervous systems disorders. The
World Health Organization has not classified MTBE as a carcinogen. Id. However,
since West Coast Hotel the rational basis standard does not require a level of evidence
even remotely close to strong conclusiveness standard-any reasonable inference is
sufficient justification. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88
(1955) (holding that a law need not be logically consistent with its aims in every
respect to be constitutional).
12.
Methanex's Legal Battle (attempt to resist California ban on MTBE),
NITROGEN & METHANOL, Nov. 1, 2000, at 29.
13.
Institute Seeks to Intervene in Methanex Suit, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Nov.
25, 2000, at B24.
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unsettled, there is strong incentive to settle Methanex's claims even
though California's actions would easily pass federal and state
scrutiny. 14 Defensive settlement in the face of high stakes has been
the fate of at least one similar Chapter 11 suit. 15
Chapter 11 also affords the investor perhaps the most coveted of
protections for challenging a public regulation: complete secrecy.' 6
Proceedings under the rules of international arbitration are kept
secret; Chapter 11 incorporates these rules.' 7 In short, an alleged
expropriation caused by a public regulation, the drafting and passage
of which were public, is decided in a secret proceeding. The public
cannot access evidence, arguments, or the ultimate rationale for the
judgment.' s
In asking the question 'What in Capitalism cannot be Co-opted?"
the Frankfort Schools Herbert Marcuse noted the conflict between
wealth-maximizing schemes like Chapter 11 and arguably inefficient
governmental or constitutional structures such as the doctrines of
federalism and separation of powers.' 9 For those like Marcuse, who
are critical of the weight given to market values, the Methanex
dispute is a textbook example of how capitalism tacitly extorts
concessions of public control in order to increase efficiency and
20
profitability.
For those wary of phrases like "triumph of capital," Chapter 11
fails on an altogether different ground because of its disregard for
federalism's sine qua non of local control. In the proliferating global
economy, the growing popularity of Chapter 11 expropriation claims
could eventually hamper both state and local decision-making.
Liability for significant economic damages and fear of acquiring an
"anti-investment" image are two specters that haunt states.2 1

14.
See generally M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAY,, ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT 277-321 (1994).
15.
Julia A. Solaway, EnvironmentalTrade Barriers under A4FT... The AMIT
Fuel Additives Controversy, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 55, 84 (1999).

16.
See infra note 86 and accompanying text. One attorney for a NAFTA
Chapter 11 dispute justified the secrecy on the grounds that potential embarrassment
from publicity is avoided. INTER PRESS SERV., Sept. 23. 1998, at 4.
17.
See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
Though beyond the scope of this Note, another topic well worth researching
18.
is what arguments under Freedom of Information Act, the Constitution, or California's
own Sunshine laws, can be made to gain access to the information in the proceeding
and attend the hearings themselves.
19.

HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE DIENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY OF

ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 196 (199 1).
20.
See generally RICHARD POSNER, EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE. 70-119 (1981)
(arguing that the common law's emphasis on economic efficiency is the primary
function of law).
21.
See Lori Wallach, NAFFA "Investor.to.State" Provision Creates Giant
Loophole for Companies to Evade Justice, at http:Aivw.citizen.orgfpressroom/
release.cfm?ID=907. Wallach, the Director of the Public Citizen's Global Trade Watch.
NAFTA, argues that Chapter 11 is not so much about trade as about creating powerful
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Though perhaps not having the initial emotional appeal of the image
that NAFTA allows American corporations to increase their profits by
stepping on the Mexican poor, the harm that Chapter 11 poses to
state and local sovereignty could have more far reaching and longterm effects.
This Note examines the constitutionality of NAFTA Chapter 11.
Part II attempts to explain the lack of consideration given to Chapter
11 by academics, journalists, and Congress. Chapter 11's general
framework will then be laid out. Part III addresses in detail the
significant Eleventh Amendment and Article III problems that
Chapter 11 presents by analyzing Chapter 11 as if it operates in a
domestic rather than international context.
In other words, if
Congress created an interstate arbitration tribunal for takings claims
made by residents of one state against another state, what would be
the result? Part IV then examines whether the federal government's
foreign affairs powers, invoked because of NAFTA's international
character, absolve Chapter 11 of its constitutional failings. This Note
finds such absolution doubtful.
This analysis of Chapter 11's constitutionality involves three of
the most nebulous and difficult areas of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence:
the scope of the treaty power, the Eleventh
Amendment, and Article III courts. This Note relies primarily on the
Supreme Court's own language while attempting to integrate the vast
corpus of secondary literature on these three difficult and dense
areas.
Though attempting to be comprehensive, these areas of
jurisprudence are so nuanced that a thorough scholarly treatment
would require many more pages.

II. CHAPTER 11: NOT SIMPLY ANOTHER BILATERAL INVESTMENT
TREATY
Intuitively, it is troubling that a foreign investor can arguably
extort settlement from the State of California over a simple health
and safety regulatory action. Though Chapter 11 has been gaining
some attention in the past year, in general it has received little
scholarly attention over the first six years of its existence, other than
a few criticisms by a handful of environmentalists.22 Hence it is
initially worth asking why Chapter 11 has largely been ignored.
Examining the context in which Congress passed Chapter 11 reveals
several reasons why it has not drawn much attention from
mainstream media, academics, or politicians.

new rights for corporations and investors at the expense of the public interest and
democratic governance. Id.
22.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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A brief perusal of Chapter 11 would lull the reader into believing
that it is yet another ordinary bilateral investment treaty (BIT). BITs
provide the necessary legal rules and incentives for protecting and
securing direct foreign investment.2 3
In fact, for some capitalexporting states, a BIT is a prerequisite for acquiring investment
insurance by the foreign investor. 24 By 1994, over 700 BITs had been
concluded. 25 On the surface, Chapter l1's structure and language
26
mirrors other BITs.
Perhaps more important than this belief that Chapter 11 is just
another BIT is that Chapter 11 already existed in NAFTA's parent,
the Canadian Free Trade Agreement (CFTA).2 7 NAFTA integrated
much of CFTA's structure and incorporated essentially the same
language of CFTA's expropriation section.28 The one interesting item
added to NAFTA is the significant language specifying in detail the
method, mode, and time of compensation if an expropriation takes
place-as if the gentlemanly Americans and Canadians did not need
29
an exact compensation structure, but the Mexicans did.
From a historical standpoint, this xenophobic difference provides
the most powerful reason for Chapter l's general acceptance. Wall
Street pushed for a powerful cause of action and an exact
compensation structure because of fears arising from the perceived
instability of Mexican politics and the "Calvo clause" of the Mexican
Constitution. 30 The investment community still recalls President
Cardenas invocation of the Mexican Constitution's Calvo clause in
1938 to nationalize the Mexican oil industry and expropriate foreign
holdings totaling eighty-one million dollars.3 1 In the minds of Wall
Street, Chapter 11 and its contentious compensation structure 32 was
necessary if American investors were to invest significantly in
33
Mexico.

23.
Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Economics of BilateralInvestment Treaties, 41
HARV. INTVL L.J. 469 (2000).
24.
RUDOLPH DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INvES
,
iENT
TREATIES 1, 12 (1995).
25.
Id. at 1 (noting the proliferation of BITs in the last two decades).
26.
Id. at Annex I (providing an invaluable compilation of model BITs from
several countries. NAFTA Chapter 11 is quite similar to these agreements.).
27.
28.
29.
30.

JOHN R. MACARTHUR, THE SELLING OF FREE TRADE 137 (2000).
Id.
Id.
See Richard D. English, Energy in the NAFTA- Free Trade Confronts the

Mexican Constitution, 1 TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L 1 (1993).
31.
MACARTHUR, supranote 27, at 133-36.
32.
See, e.g., DOLZER, supra note 24, at 108-12; see also SORNARAJAH, supra
note 14, at 357-414 (noting that compensation for expropriation is one of the most
controversial topics in international law).
33.
See generally Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and
Forging Direct Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 259 (1994) (discussing Mexico's purported seventy year history of
expropriating foreign assets).
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In the context of the mainstream interpretation of Mexico's
history of expropriation, the commonplace nature of BITs in global
investment today, and CFTA's precursor expropriation clause, there
appeared to be "little news" in Chapter l's inclusion. Coupled with
the irony that Wall Street's demand for Chapter 1l's broad, powerful
cause of action and detailed compensation structure has only been
used against U.S. states in the last few years, this seeming lack of
novelty explains Chapter l's general obscurity.
Chapter 11 gained notoriety when the Canadian funeral home
conglomerate, the Loewen Group claimed that the basic structure of
Mississippi's trial system "expropriated" their investment.34 After a
large jury verdict for tortious interference with contract that
threatened to bankrupt the conglomerate, the Loewen Group made a
Chapter 11 claim alleging that Mississippi's civil trial system and its
bond requirement for appeal effectively expropriated its investment
35
in violation of Chapter 11.

Another explanation for the lack of comment on Chapter 11 lies
in the general structure of the NAFTA agreement. On its face,
Chapter 11 appears to be far less problematic than NAFTA's other
two dispute resolution systems, Chapters 19 and 20.36 Both of these
chapters involve binational panels, and unlike Chapter 11, empower
the panel to definitively interpret U.S. law while denying Article III
review of the panel's decision. 37 As might be expected, these chapters
have received a substantial amount of scholarly attention. 38
Furthermore, Congress recognized the potential constitutional
difficulties with Chapter 19 and 20 and included a right to a direct
appeal regarding their constitutionality in NAFTA's Implementation
Act.

39

34.
See, e.g., David Haigh, Chapter 11-Private Party vs. Governments,
Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Frankenstein or Safety Valve? 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J.
115, 126 (2000); Brian Milner, Loewen Group invokes NAFTA Clause, Funeral Home
files damages against U.S. Government for crippling State Court ruling, GLOBE &
MAIL, Nov. 11 1998, at B1.
35.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
36.
The North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605,
682-99 [hereinafter NAFTA].
37.
Id.
38.
Michael S. Valihora, NAFTA Chapter 19 or The WTO's Dispute Settlement
Body: A Hobson's Choice for Canada?, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INTL L. 447 (1998); Ethan
Boyer, Article III, the Foreign Relations Power, and The Binational Panel System of
NAFTA, 13 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 101 (1996); Robert P. Deyling, Free Trade
Agreements and The Federal Courts: Emerging Issues, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 353 (1996);
Patricia Kelmar, BinationalPanels of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
in Action: The Constitutional Challenge Continues, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
173 (1993); Jim C. Chen, Appointments with Disaster: The Unconstitutionality of
BinationalArbitral Review Under the United States-CanadaFree Trade Agreement, 49
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1455 (1992) (one of the few scholars concluding that these
schemes are unconstitutional).
39.
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(g)(4)(H) (1994).
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Finally, as will be made evident in Part III, Chapter 11's
emergence from obscurity results in part from the U.S. Supreme
Court's revival of federalism over the past several years. 40 With what
some have called a radical shift 41 towards states' rights in the past
five years, it is an open question whether Chapter 11 offers a viable
constitutional scheme. In the first half of the twentieth century, the
U.S. Supreme Court significantly weakened states rights when it held
that the Executive's treaty power could regulate an area normally the
exclusive province of the state police power.4 2 Following the Supreme
Court's holdings in Seminole Tribe v. Florida and its progeny,
Congress' ability to trump state sovereign immunity through its
treaty power appears to be a newly opened question.4 3 NAFTA
passed before the Supreme Court's recent reinvigoration of state
sovereign immunity.
NAFTA includes eight parts, spanning issues from trade in goods
to intellectual property. 44 Chapter 11 is included in part five, which
governs Investment, Services and Related Materials.45 Chapter 11
specifically creates a cause of action for "expropriation," as well as a
dispute resolution mechanism for resolving "expropriation" claims. 46
Despite its relation to other BITs, Chapter 11 has been called the
most comprehensive investment accord ever entered into by the
United States.47 Chapter 11 is divided into three sections.4 8 Section
A lays out its broad scope and provides at least four basic
protections. 49 Section B creates the mechanism for resolving NAFTA
investment disputes, 50 and section C provides definitions.ti
Before detailing Chapter l1's basic protections as set forth in
section A, one must recognize Chapter 11's sweeping definition of
"investment."52 The definition is not restricted to the traditional
formulation of equity and debt securities or direct investment in an

40.
41.

See infra Part III.
Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutinal Federalism:

The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUm.. L. REV. 2213,
2220 (1996).
42.
See infra Part II, Section 2, part A. As will be argued later, it is not clear
whether Chapter 11 could even operate under an expansive reading of Missouri v.
Holland. See generally Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
43.
See infra Part III.
44.
NAFIA, supranote 36, at 296-456, 605-800.
45.
Id. at 639.
46.
Id. at 639-49.
47.
Richard C. Levin & Susan Erikson Marin, NAFTA Chapter 11: Investment
and Investment Disputes, 2-SuM NAFTA. L. & BUS. REV. AM. 82,83 (1996).
48.
NAFTA, supranote 36, at 639.
49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 642.
51.
Id. at 647.
52.
Id.
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enterprise. 5 3 It also includes "real estate or other property, tangible
and intangible," as well as capital commitments to contracts
concerning the investor's property or contracts where repayment
depends upon production. 54 This comprehensive definition includes
the "goodwill value" of a business. Though international law has
scant and conflicting precedent for recognizing indirect takings,
defining investment in such a broad manner is a standard tactic of
BITs-perhaps reflecting an effort to generate new law for indirect
expropriation claims by bootstrapping a broad definition of
55
investment to international agreements.
This broad definition of investment strengthens indirect
expropriation claims like Methanex's because it provides language to
argue against the "standard" definition of expropriation as a direct
seizure of property or breach of a concessions contract. 56 Generally,
traditional international law has only recognized expropriation
claims involving direct takings, primarily the cancellation of
concession contracts between the state and private party. 57 There
are, however, conflicting decisions recognizing indirect expropriation
58
claims.
Chapter 11's far reaching powers come primarily from the
mandates of Articles 1102 through Article 1114 of subchapter A,
particularly from Article 1110's expropriation clause.59 There are at
least four basic rights in subchapter A: freedom of performance
requirements, non-discriminatory treatment and most favored nation
treatment, free mobility of investments, and a cause of action for
expropriation as interpreted under international law.6 0
The first several articles address non-discriminatory treatment
on behalf of the investor party. 61 Article 1102 states that foreign
investors and their investments shall receive "treatment no less
favorable than [the country] accords, in like circumstances, to its own
[investors]. ' ' 62 Article 1103 further clarifies that parties shall receive

53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
DOLZER, supra note 24, at 25-30.
56.
Levin, supra note 47, at 94 (their prototypical example of an alleged
Chapter 11 violation is a dispute over a concession agreement); George H. Aldrich,
What Constitutesa Compensable Taking of Property? The Decisions of the Iran-United
States Claims Tribunal, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 585 (1994); Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the
Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals and the International Law of
Expropriation,85 AM. J. INT'L L. 474 (1991). See generally SORNARAJAH, supra note 14,
at 277-321.
57.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
58.
Maurizio Brunetti, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, NAFTA
Chapter11, and the Doctrine ofIndirect Expropriation,2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 203 (2001).
59.
NAFrA, supra note 36, at 639-42.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.

62.

Id. at 639.
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most favored nation treatment. 63 Finally, Article 1104 makes clear
that the investor and investment shall receive the better of the two
standards."
After setting out the standards for non-discriminatory
treatment, the next several articles have more specific aims.63 To tie
NAFTA to the broader international legal framework, Article 1105
adopts international legal standards for protecting investments. This
ignores the fact that these international standards do not seem to
support such a broad definition of "investment."66 Article 1106 seeks
to curtail signatories' covert control of foreign investment by
forbidding the adoption of regulations that force foreign investors to
meet specific requirements. 67 Article 1107 explicitly prohibits
governments from interfering with the make-up of senior
management or boards of directors. 68 Article 1108 details the
national exceptions to the above obligations listed in the detailed
Annexes I, II, EEI, and IV or Volume II of the agreement. 69 Article
1109 ensures transfer of investment without delay, which at one time
70
was considered the most important clause in BITs.
The focal point of Chapter 11, as well as the focus of this Note, is
Article 1110. Unlike the previous articles that lay out standards, this
article defines the specific cause of action in Chapter 11. 7 1 Article
1110 states:
no party may directly or indirectly nationalize or exproprate an
investment of an investor of another party in its territory or take a
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such
investment except:
(a) For a public purpose;

(b) On a non-discriminatory basis;
(c)

In accordance with due process of law and article 1105(1); and,

(d) On payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2
through 6....

Unlike its predecessor in CFTA, Article 1110 goes on to state that
compensation must be made according to fair market value of the
expropriated investment, calculated from immediately before the
72
expropriation took place.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
Id. at 639-42.
66.
Id at 639-40.
67.
Id at 640 (including subjects such as production, export, domestic content,
domestic use, or technology).
68.
Id.
69.
Id. at 641, 704-62.
70.
Id. at 641.
71.
Id. at 641-42.
72.
Id.

1454

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 34:1443

Contrasted with prior NAFTA sections, the final four portions of3
7
section A do not create specific constraints on government action.
Rather, they address specific issues like the free mobility of capital
investment. 74 It is important to note that section 1114 states that
"nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent a party from
adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent
with this chapter that it considers appropriate ... [to undertake for
sensitive environmental concerns]."'7 5 This environmental catch-all
was a concession to various protests about NAFTA's lack of concern
for the environment. Yet, it has not prevented companies from
challenging government environmental action under Article 1110.76
Section B lays out the specific dispute resolution system for
implementing and enforcing section A. 77 The key section is 1120,
which details the "no two bites of the same apple" policy. 78 For a
proceeding to commence under Chapter 11, investors must choose
either the forum of international arbitration or a court within the
offending country's court system; they cannot pursue both avenues. 79
For example, if a U.S. or Canadian investor has already brought a
claim in a Mexican court, Mexico can invoke Annex 1120.1 to prevent
the claim from proceeding in arbitration."
Under Chapter 11, the investor controls forum selection. 81 For
example, in the case of Methanex, California is afforded no option to
have the claim against it reviewed in either a federal or state court.
California is also forced to accept the United States as its
representative.8 2 California must litigate in the plaintiffs choice of
forum.
Hence, a savvy investor will choose only international
8 3
arbitration.
Once a claim is submitted, the investor must select the
arbitration rules under which he wants to proceed. 8 4 There are
several international arbitral institutions. However, NAFTA limits
the investor's choice to three: the ICSID Convention, Additional

73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at 642.
76.
Id.
77.
Id. at 642-47.
78.
Id. at 643; see also Levin & Marin, supra note 47, at 91.
79.
Id. at 642, 648.
80.
Id. at 648. If the company is pursing monetary awards under arbitration,
they can still seek injunctions within the offending country's court system. Id.
81.
Id. at 643.
82.
Id.
83.
See generally Neil McDonnell, The Availability of Provisional Relief in
InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 273 (1984); Henry
P. de Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Substitute for
National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42 (1982).
84.
See NAFTA, supra note 36, at 643.
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Facility Rule of ICSID, and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.8 All
three of these conventions mandate secrecy in their proceedng. 86
In sum, Chapter 11 provides the international investor with a
powerful cause of action for challenging government regulation.
Some may argue that this seemingly broad cause of action is
undercut by section 1105's incorporation of principles of international
81
law, where there is sparse precedent for upholding indirect takings.
From a legal process perspective, however, by incorporating such a
broad definition of investment, the international investment
community will eventually create such precedent.8 8
More significantly, not only has Congress created a powerful new
cause of action, it has also created a powerful alternative forum. In a
Chapter 11 action against a U.S. state, the foreign investor can elect
to force review of state action before an international tribunal. This
presents difficult questions of state sovereign immunity and the scope
of Article III.

III. ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS
This section will begin by analyzing Chapter 11 as if it were
operating in a hypothetical interstate context in order to address
three crucial questions. First, can Congress, under its commerce
power, abrogate state sovereign immunity to allow an out-of-state
investor to sue a state? Second, can Congress condition state
participation in an interstate commercial scheme on state waiver of
its sovereign immunity? Finally, can disputes arising out of such a
scheme be adjudicated without Article III review? This section

85.
Id.
86.
A primary characteristic of commercial arbitration is its confidentiahty.
See Report of the Secretary-General on the Revised Draft. (AICN.91112). VII Yearbooh
of UNCITRAL, 157, 164 (1976). UNCITRAL Rule 25 requires that only the "parties"
attend the in camera hearing of the arbitration. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, United
Nations, Rule 25(4) (1977). ICSID Convention Rule 32(2) states that the "[t]ribunal
shall decide, with the consent of the parties, which other persons besides the parties,
their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and experts during their testimony, and
officers of the [t]ribunal may attend the hearings." RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR
ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS, ICSD, R. 32(2), available at http/Av%w.worldbankorgl
icsidlbasicdoc/77.htm. ISCID Additional Facility Rule 39(2) incorporates the exact
language as ICSID Rule 32(2). Id. R. 39(2). But see Fulvio Fracassi, Confidentslity
and NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 213 (2001) (arguing that the
international arbitrators are not compelled to keep secrecy and can in a Chapter 11
situation allow for public access).
87.
Brunetti, supra note 58.
88.
See Andrew T. Guzman, WThy LDC's Sign Treaties that Hurt Them:

Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L 639, 683
(1998) (providing a fascinating discussion on how the proliferation of BITs has affected
the doctrine of takings in customary international law).
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focuses exclusively on a hypothetical domestic scheme.
The
international aspects of NAFTA will be addressed in Part IV.
For purposes of illustration, consider a hypothetical
congressional scheme created to spur interstate commerce and
investment, the "Interstate Investment Act" (IIA).
Under this
hypothetical Act, Congress provides special incentives and privileges
to encourage private investor participation. Aware of investors'
justified fears of state sovereign immunity, Congress decides to either
abrogate state sovereign immunity outright or, more covertly, offers
to pay states to waive immunity. Under the hypothetical IIA, the outof-state investor is empowered to sue the state to recoup investment
funds.
Furthermore, in an effort to assuage lingering investor fears,
Congress throws in a few more key investor perks: a potentially
much broader cause of action for a takings claim and, more
importantly, the right to pursue the claim via interstate arbitration,
with no Article III review. The investor can now pursue the claim in
a confidential hearing before an interstate arbitral forum-an action
that is much cheaper, more efficient, and avoids the lax "rational
basis" standard of review of the federal court system.
This hypothetical raises three primary issues: abrogation of
state sovereign immunity, incentivized waiver of state sovereign
immunity, and non-Article III adjudication of a dispute involving a
federal cause of action and a state party.
A. Could Congress Simply Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity in
Order to Promote InterstateInvestment?
Five years ago, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the Supreme Court
directly confronted this question.8 9 To grasp the broad reach of state
sovereign immunity in Seminole Tribe, the legal backdrop of the
Eleventh Amendment and two watershed cases will briefly be
addressed.
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State."9 0 The Eleventh Amendment literally refers to jurisdiction; the
language does not mention the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 91
However, Hans v. Louisiana extended the text to include the
comprehensive principle that a state is immune from any suit unless

89.
90.
91.

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

Id.
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it chooses to recognize it. 92 Hans specifically stated, "the suability of
a State without its consent is a thing unknown to the law."9 3 Hans
grafted onto the Eleventh Amendment a monolithic principal that
bars all suits against a state because of the substantive principal of
94
sovereign immunity.
The broad holding of Hans was limited twelve years ago by
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, which held that Congress could abrogate
state immunity under the commerce power.95
Pennsylvania
attempted to raise the Eleventh Amendment as a defense when faced
with liability in a Superfund cleanup. 96 Justice Brennan, writing for
a plurality of the Court, held that
the congressional power... would be incomplete without the authority,
to render states liable in damages, it must be that to the extent that the
states gave Congress the authority to regulate commerce, they also
relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in
97
exercising this authority to render them liable.

The 5-4 majority in Seminole Tribe directly overruled Justice
Brennan's plurality opinion in Union Gas and instead extended the
principal set forth in Hans.98 The Court examined the question
whether the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) could authorize
Indian tribes to sue a state in federal court if that state failed to
negotiate in good faith.9 9 The Court held, inter alia, that Congress
could not abrogate state immunity under the commerce clause. The
Court stated that the "plurality's rationale [in Union Gas] deviated
sharply from our established federalism jurisprudence and essentially

92.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
93.
Id. at 16.
94.
Id. Ignoring the dicta concerning the Eleventh Amendment in various
Marshall Court opinions, the Hans Court read the Eleventh Amendment as addressing
a substantive issue rather than a jurisdictional issue-in fact, the heated debate
between the dissent and majorities in recent Eleventh Amendment cases boils down to
this question of substance or jurisdiction. It is worth noting that the Hans holding has
received considerable criticisms from various Supreme Court Justices, most notably
Justice Souter's lengthy dissent in Seminole Tribe and Alden u. Maine, heavily
criticizing the holding of Hans. Seminole Tribe 517 U.S. at 100-85; see also Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 734 (1999); Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)
(Justice Brennan distinguishing Hans in his Atascadero dissent and Union Gas
plurality); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlen, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
95.
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 7.
96.
Id. at 6.
97.
Id. at 19-20. Justice Stevens in his concurrence added that, with respect to
the judicially created doctrine of state immunity found in Hans (as opposed to the
literal text of the Eleventh Amendment), Congress can by statute trump the Court
created rule of Hans and use its "plenary power to subject the States to suit in federal
court." Id. at 24 (Stevens, J., concurring).
98.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.
99.
Id. at 46.
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eviscerated our decision in Hans."'100 Noting this sharp deviation
from Hans, the Court felt "bound" to overrule Union Gas.10 1
Accordingly, after Seminole Tribe, nothing survives from the
Union Gas precedent. 0 2 Congress cannot, under its commerce
power, abrogate state sovereign immunity. Hence, a hypothetical
scheme like the IIA that promotes interstate investment by waiving
state sovereign immunity cannot be justified under the commerce
clause.
Congress might also attempt to bootstrap the IIA to its
03
abrogation power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.1
An action pursued under the IIA is essentially an alleged taking by a
state. With the Fifth Amendment incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress might attempt to abrogate sovereign
immunity to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 4 Writing for the
Court, Justice Rehnquist stated, "the Eleventh Amendment, and the
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies are necessarily
limited by the enforcement provisions of section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'1 5 The Court held in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzker
that if the Eleventh Amendment clashed with the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment would prevail.' 0 6
If Congress were to pass the hypothetical IIA under its abrogation
power of the Fourteenth Amendment, two questions would arise. First,
is this prophylactic remedy too broad? Second, how narrowly has the
Supreme Court defined property for the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment? If the abrogation does not proportionally correspond to
the Fourteenth Amendment violations, and in the IIA context if does
not involve "property," then it is unconstitutional.
As to the first question, the Court has held that "as broad as the
congressional enforcement power is [under section 5], it is not
unlimited."'1 7 Congressional enforcement power is remedial in

100.
Id. at 64. The Court noted that Union Gas was a plurality opinion in which
the fifth vote, Justice White, stated in his concurrence that he did not agree with much
of the reasoning of the plurality. Id. This move is quite disingenuous on the part of
Justice Rehnquist because Justice White disagreed with the reasoning employed by the
plurality examining whether Congress "intended" to abrogate state immunity in the
CERCLA scheme. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 45. On the point at issue in Seminole Tribe,
Justice White fully agreed with the plurality that the commerce power could trump
state sovereign immunity. Id.
101.
Id. at 66.
102.
Id. at 72.
103.
See generally Fitzpatrick v. Bitzker, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).

104.

Id.

105.
106.
107.

Id. at 456.
Id.
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970).
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nature. 10 8 Congress must identify a pattern of state constitutional
violations.
Furthermore, there must be a "congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end."10 9 Without any history of state
expropriation of foreign investment, Congress cannot provide such a
broad remedial cause of action against the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 110
The Supreme Court has interpreted property quite narrowly.11 1
In College Savings Bank 1, the Court found that two species of
"property" did not fall under protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 112 Neither the right to be free
from a business competitors' false advertising nor the more
generalized right to be "secure in one's business interests" constitutes
11 3
a property right recognized by the Due Process Clause.
Consequently, College Savings Bank H seems to foreclose a
Fourteenth Amendment claim of indirect takings, such as California's
1 4
ban on the use of MTBE. 1
This narrow definition of property must be balanced against the
Court's recent reinvigoration of indirect takings or inverse
condemnation claims. 115 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
the Court found that South Carolina must compensate private
landowners because the government's Beach Front Management Act
effectively prohibited all economically productive and beneficial uses of
the land.116 However, as is obvious, Lucas involves real property.
In sum, this hypothetical illustrates why Congress cannot
abrogate state sovereign immunity either under the commerce power
or the Fourteenth Amendment for a scheme promoting interstate
117
investment and commerce.

108.
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997); sce alzo Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82 (2000) (asserting that Congress' enforcement
power serves as a remedy).
109.
Flores,521 U.S. at 520.
110.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 640 (1999) (noting the recent decision in College Savings Bank I, just as Congress
had no evidence that states were taking property without compensation by infringing
patents).
111.
Id. at 666.
112. Id. at 675.
113.
Id. at 672.
114. Id.
115.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
116.
Id. The Court extended the Lucas precedent in Polazzolo v. Rhode Island;
however, Palazzolo, like Lucas, was another situation involving real property. Since
Palazzolo does not adopt a broad definition of property, its reaffirmation that indirect
takings occur is of no avail. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
117.
There is one devilish wrinkle to this analysis more suitably dealt with in a
footnote. As stated in the abstract, the Author asserts that when examining the
specific structure of Chapter 11, Congress arguably circumvents the limit of its
abrogation power by authorizing the United States to arbitrate on behalf of California.
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B. Could Congress Condition State Participationin the Interstate
Investment Act to Waiver of Sovereign Immunity?
Congress might attempt to justify the hypothetical scheme via
the spending power. Congress would insure that states "choose" to
waive immunity to receive funding. Therefore, although Congress
has not literally created a funding program, it has ensured the end
result of a funding program in that "benefits" are created by the IIA.
This argument seems to blur the line between cash grants, which
a state can choose to accept, and outright commands, which the state
must follow. By blending the spending power with the commerce
power, such a purported justification conflates commands and
payments. One can choose not to accept a cash bribe, but a command
is involuntary. Thus, if Congress attempted to justify itself on these
grounds, the Supreme Court would have to agree that the unique set
of facts presented by the IIA somehow merited overlooking this
distinction between spending under the spending clause and
commanding under the commerce power.
If the Court were to permit Congress to blur this distinction, the
critical question is whether the state can accept "payment" on the
condition that it waives what perhaps is the essence of statehood,
sovereign immunity. Only a few cases directly address whether
Congress can provoke state waiver of immunity through its spending
power; indeed, the Supreme Court has never directly confronted this
question in its own spending power jurisprudence.1 18 Rather, two
recent opinions from the Eighth and Fourth Circuits are the only
decisions examining the tying of a waiver of sovereign immunity to
participation in a federal spending program. 119 On the Supreme
Court level, South Dakota v. Dole, New York v. United States, and
recent dicta in College Savings Bank v. FloridaPrepaid all set forth
principles in this general area of Congressional coercion, but do not

So technically, Congress never "abrogates" California's sovereign immunity because the
United States is the party in arbitration defending California's action against the
disgruntled investor. However, the NAFTA Implementation Act has no language even
hinting at the possibility that the United States will indemnify a state found violating
Chapter 11.
Not only does this formal legal gerrymandering stretch the limits good faith, it still
substantively acts as a de facto abrogation of state immunity because the state is still
liable for damages and its policy creation is effectively constrained and skewed because
of liability fears. This formalistic gerrymandering also raises another difficult question
beyond the scope of this Note-whether the United States can force California to give
up its right of self-representation in either an interstate or international commercial
arbitration. If Congress could abrogate in this instance, could it step in and substitute
itself as the defender of the state rather than the state itself?.
118.
Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 666; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
119.
Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000); Litman v. George
Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999).
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provide any concrete legal precedent.1 20 As discussed infra, the
Eighth and the Fourth Circuit provide some analysis, in Jim C. v.
United States and Litman u. George Mason, respectively.
The Supreme Court emphasizes the element of choice in its
spending power cases. 12 1 Though not a typical spending clause case,
the often cited case New York v. United States explicitly states that
attaching strings to funds is a "permissible method of encouraging a
State to conform to federal policy choices." 122 States can either comply
with conditions Congress mandates for receiving the funds or choose
not to accept the funds. 123 The New York Court also laid down the socalled anti-commandeering principle: "The Constitution does not
confer upon Congress the ability simply to compel the States to
[actl."' 2 4 As the Court recently stated in College Savings Bank,
"Congress has no obligation to use its spending clause power to
disburse funds to the States; such funds are gifts." 2 5 Congress can
require waiver of immunity even though Congress cannot order the
126
waiver directly.
Because of a fear that this erases all limits to Congress' spending
power, Justice O'Connor, in her lone dissent in South Dakota v.Dole,
along with a few independently-minded law professors,' 2 7 argues for
a narrow interpretation of the spending power. 128 Justice O'Connor
argues that,
if the spending power is to be limited only by Congress' notion of the
general welfare, the reality, given the vast financial resources of the
Federal Government, is that the Spending Clause gives 'power to the
Congress to tear down the barriers, to invade the states' jurisdiction,
and to become a parliament of the whole people, subject to no
12 9
restrictions save such as are self-imposed.'

O'Connor's dissent aside, one can find a few limitations within the
majority opinion. First, the spending power must be for the general
welfare. 3 0 Closely connected to this, if there are conditions tied to
the grant, there must be a nexus where the conditions bear some

120.
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
121.
Id.
122.
New York, 505 U.S. at 168.
123.
Id.
124.
Id. at 149.
125.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 686-87 (1999).
126.
Id. at 687.
127.
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 213 (1987); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry

Friedman, ConditionalSpending: FederalisinsTrojan Horse, 1988 SUP. Cr. REv. 85.
128.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Critics see this as
resurrecting the original debate between Madison and Hamilton of whether spending
for the "General Welfare" allows Congress to spend on things other than those
correlated with Article I enumerated powers.
129.

Id. (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78 (1936)).

130.

Id. at 207.
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relationship to the purpose of the federal spending. 131 As in many
other areas of its jurisprudence, the Supreme Court also invoked a
clear statement rule, holding that if there are conditions tied to the
132
Most
federal funding, then these conditions must be clearly stated.
importantly for the purposes of this Note, the conditions cannot
violate any free-standing constitutional prohibitions, nor can they be
133
considered "coercive."
New York and Dole fail to address directly whether Congress can
request waiver of the Eleventh Amendment by the states. Recent
authority from the Eighth and Fourth Circuits addressed this
question as applied to two different federal acts. In Litman v. George
Mason University, the Fourth Circuit examined whether Title IX in
Congress' educational funding programs can impose liability on state
funding recipients for non-intentional discrimination. 134 The court
decided that Congress lacked this power under the Fourteenth
Amendment; however, it can condition the receipt of such funds on
the waiver of sovereign immunity. 135 The Litman court analogized
the situation to a contractual relationship-federal funds exchanged
136
in consideration for state agreement to the attached conditions.
The Fourth Circuit found that the state's "voluntary and knowing
acceptance" of the contract waived sovereign immunity. 137 The court
emphasized that the conditions of the contract were clearly stated. 138
The Eighth Circuit reasoned along the same lines. Jim C.
likened the situation to any ordinary quid pro quo, which the
Supreme Court has repeatedly approved. 139 The Jim C. court found
that a sacrifice of twelve percent of the state education budget did not
rise to the level of coercion noted in South Dakota v. Dole. 140 Like the
Fourth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit developed its version of the clear
statement rule. 14 1 Hence, the court concluded that this was a valid,
non-coercive waiver of state immunity.
When applying this to the IIA, there is the evident threshold
problem of analogizing tangible federal funds with its concomitant
choice to accept and a commerce power program aimed at creating a
future non-tangible benefit that lacks choice.
If this threshold
problem was resolved-which is highly doubtful-then Jim C. and

131.
Id. at 207-08 (holding that that the condition of a 21 year old drinking age
requirement correlates to funding for interstate highways).
132.
Id. at 207.
133.
Id. at 211.
134.
Litman v. George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 548-54 (4th Cir. 1999).
135.
Id. at 554.
136.
Id. at 551.
137.
Id. at 555.
138.
Id.
139.
Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1081-82 (8th Cir. 2000).
140.
Id. at 1082.
141.
Id.
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Litman might stand as precedent for holding that Congress can tie
14 2
funding to waiver of state sovereign immunity.
C. Could Congress EliminateArticle LI Reuiew of Disputes Involving
States?
The previous sections establish that state sovereign immunity
cannot be breached; hence, NAFTA Chapter 11's hypothetical
domestic equivalent, the IIA, is unconstitutional.
Assuming,
however, that the Court allows abrogation, this section spotlights a
separate constitutional flaw in Chapter 11. It examines whether
Congress can force states to forego all access to Article III courts for a
given dispute.
An important analytic problem arises when applying the
following tests to an IIA or NAFTA Chapter 11 situation. Northern
Pipeline, Thomas, and Schor are all cases involving individuals
seeking access to Article III courts. 143 By contrast, in the IIA and
NAFTA situation, a state wants to insist on an Article III court. A
state cannot reliably stand on due process claims, because the novel
question of whether a state can be denied due process has never
before been litigated. Furthermore, the basic distinction between
144
states and people remains, despite scholarly debate.
There are several extant tests for determining what can be
assigned to non-Article III courts. Two tests that hinge upon the
doctrine of public rights will be examined first. Next, the multifactored pragmatic test that appears to be gaining favor will be
examined. This section concludes with an analysis of the literal
language of Article III.
1. Public Rights-Based Analyses
Though muted by the flexible test of Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor, the case of Northern Pipeline Construction Co.
v. MarathonOil Pipeline Co. offers the most plausible justification for
145
empowering Congress to force states into interstate arbitration.
Though many scholars consider Northern Pipeline dead letter, the
analysis remains relevant because it offers bright lines as a basis for

142.
Id. at 1081-82.
143.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 837 (1986);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S 568, 575 (1985); Northern Pipeline

Constr. Co. v. Marathon Oil Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 56 (1982).
144.
REV. 1121
personified
145.

See generally Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTRE DAME. L
(2000) (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions have improperly
states just as corporations were improperly personified a century ago).
Schor, 478 U.S. at 833; Northern Pipeline 458 U.S. at 50.
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discussion. Furthermore, its definition 146
of public rights is the most
favorable for justifying Congress' actions.
The basic argument for denying Congress the flexibility to set up
alternative courts looks to the literal language of Article III, which
states that the judicial power shall rest in courts with lifetime tenure
and salary protection. 147 Thus a court lacking these guarantees
places the judicial power outside of Article III, contrary to its
unambiguous language.
The emerging administrative state during the first half of the
twentieth century recasts in a new form the question of Congress'
power to set up alternative courts or grant to the executive quasijudicial powers. Though precedent had been building, standard
history interprets Crowell v. Benson as the Supreme Court's official
blessing of administrative adjudication. 1 48 Fifty years later in
Northern Pipeline, the Court signaled what could be a definitive
limitation of Crowell and its progeny. 149
In examining the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, the Court held that Congress went too far in
assigning Article III powers to Article I courts when it gave an Article
I court jurisdiction over concurrent state law claims. 150 The dispute
at issue involved whether a bankruptcy court could hear state
contract disputes. 151 The Northern Pipeline Court held that Congress
violated the separation of powers doctrine by expanding an Article I
2
court's jurisdiction to include private common law rights. 15
Northern Pipeline's significance is its formalistic distinction
between public and private rights. 15 3 The dated concept of public
rights goes back to Murray's Lessee, handed down before the Civil
War. 154 However, Northern Pipeline's sharp juxtaposition of the
public and private right affirmed Congress' latitude in the arena of
public rights. In defining a public right, Congress can create
presumptions or prescribe remedies. 155 Essentially, if Congress
created the benefits-often described as a public right-such as a
welfare program, then Congress can decide how it wants to adjudicate

146.
Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 67-70.
147.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
148.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S 22 (1932); Gordon G. Young, Public Right and
FederalJudicial Power: From Murray's Lessee through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L.
REV. 765, 841-46 (1994); see also RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WESCHLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 395 (1996) [hereinafter HART AND
WESCHLER].

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
284 (1855).
155.

Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 50.
Id. at 62.
Id.
Id. at 67-70.
Id.
Murray's Lessee v. The Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272,
Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 67-70.
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disputes concerning that right as long as it meets the basic
156
requirements of procedural due process.
Though its clarity is wanting, Northern Pipelines definition of
private right is summed up in a two-part test. (1) Is it a claim
involving private parties? 157 (2) Is it "the stuff of the traditional
actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in
1789[?]"158 When applying this to the hypothetical IIA, it appears
that the answer is no for both of these questions. Consequently,
under Northern Pipeline, Congress could plausibly assign the case to
be heard by a non-Article III entity. 159
The further issue of denying all Article III review, however,
contradicts black letter law. Under Crowell, Congress must allow for
some form of meaningful review by an Article III court. 160 On this
requirement, both the IIA and NAFTA schemes must fail.
Six years later the Supreme Court provided a clearer definition
of public rights in Thomas v. Union Carbide.161 The Thomas Court
defined public rights as rights so "closely integrated into a public
regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution
with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary."'162 In the case
of the general strictures of NAFTA's Implementation Act, there is not
a closely connected public regulatory scheme. In fact, what is labeled
"foreign investmentlinvesting" would be more properly characterized
as a private right because it sounds predominately in contract and
has been essentially unregulated since the birth of the United
States. 163
Furthermore, a major impetus for Constitutional
ratification was to encourage foreign investment, previously realized
in the Colonial period but lost under the Articles of Confederation.16 4
Thus, under Thomas, the broad strictures and general cause of
action in the IIA does not fit the public rights mold. 6 5 It is very
difficult to analogize it to the prototypical public right, a welfare
benefit or a labor relations NLRB claim. Obviously, this is not to say
contrary to post-New Deal jurisprudence that Congress cannot

156.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
157.
Northern Pipeline,458 U.S. at 70.
158.
Id. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
159.
Id. at 67-70.
160.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S 22, 53-54 (1932).
161.
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
162.
Id. at 593-94.
163.
HART & WESCHLER, supra note 148, at 395-96.
164.
See generally Alexander Hamilton & James Winthrop, Further Defects in
the Present System; The Power to Incorporateand the Regulation of Commerce, in THE
DEBATE ON THE CONsTITUTION 505-19 (1993) (noting that the need for the Consututon
arises in part because of current commercial disorganization).
165.
See generally NAFTA, supra note 36.
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regulate a traditional private right-freedom and creation of
contracts vis-a-vis investment-with a public regulatory scheme. 16
Though it makes some sense to characterize foreign investment
as a statutory right granted by the sovereign, it makes little sense to
define a state's right to solicit foreign investment as a public or
statutory right.
Though the states are banned from making
international compacts, 167 foreign investment in states-bonds-has
always been a part of standard state government activity. 168
Perhaps, if Congress had explicitly granted to states the power to
exercise their police power in a manner that singled out foreign
investors or foreign governments, then this plausibly might be
characterized as a statutory right. 169 However, NAFTA considered no
such power and, more importantly, to return to the specific facts
which prompt this Note, California's MTBE ban is a blind exercise of
170
the police power affecting domestic as well as foreign companies.
From both the investor's and the state's perspective, a Chapter
11 action is quite similar to a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment
takings action, a constitutional not a statutory right. 171 Such takings
actions concern property and have nothing to do with the investor's
nationality. Foreign investors have access to federal and state courts
to adjudicate rights over their property in the United States just like
domestic investors.
Arguably, the drafters of NAFTA recognized that Chapter 11
addresses a private right because the drafters did not take away an
investor's option to pursue a claim in state or federal court. 172 The
plaintiff elects to bring the suit before an international arbitration
tribunal. If a consent option had been afforded to the states perhaps
much of the constitutional dilemma could have been avoided. 173 Even
so, the Crowell problem remains because the NAFTA scheme denies
174
states Article III review of tribunal decisions.

166.
See generally Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
167.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
168.
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
169.
See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)
(holding that a Massachusetts ban of Burmese products under its human rights laws
violated the dormant foreign commerce power).
170.
Solaway, supra note 15, at 77.
171.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
172.
NAFTA, supra note 36, at 642-48.
173.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 837 (1986)
(noting that the consent option acts as a safeguard because it protects Congress from the
claim that it removed the claim, rather the litigant consented to the removal).
174.
See generally Crowell, 285 U.S. at 22.

20011

A BRAVE NEW LOCHNER ERA?

1467

2. Schor's Multi-Factored Approach
Northern Pipeline's focus on the public/private dichotomy has
subsequently been muted by Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor which declined to follow Northern Pipeline and
adopted a more pragmatic multi-factored test. 175 Paying homage to

Northern Pipeline, Schor stated "Article III, section 1 not only
preserves to litigants their interest in an impartial and independent
federal adjudication of claims with the judicial power of the United
States, but also serves 'an inseparable element of the constitutional
system of checks and balances." ' 176 While affirming the importance of

the separation of powers, Schor also limited Northern Pipeline,
stating that "[a]lthough such rules might lend a greater degree of
coherence to this area of the law, they might also unduly constrict
Congress' ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its
Article I powers."

177

Bright lines will not suffice: "due regard must be given in each
case to the unique aspects of the congressional plan" along with the
other factors that underlie Article III. 17 8 Apparently, the Court will

examine not only Northern Pipeline's concern with "the origins and
importance of the right to be adjudicated," but at least two other
factors: the concerns which drove Congress to depart from the
requirements of Article III and the range of jurisdiction exercised by
179
the non-Article III forum.
Assuming Congress' motives can be ascertained in the first place,
when applying Schor's test to NAFTA, Congress has the legitimate
motive of improving international trade and increasing commerce.
The expertise needed to analyze complex international trade disputes
arguably is lacking in the federal court system.' 8 0 Thus, such a
maneuver would increase the efficiency of international business
transactions and allow increased economic benefits. Furthermore, it
is doubtful that Congress desires to supplant an Article III court with
175.

See generally Schor, 478 U.S. at 833; Thomas, 473 U.S. at 568. This test

was advocated by Justice White in his Northern Pipelinedissent.
176.
Schor, 478 U.S. at 850 (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58)
(emphasis added).
177. Id. at 851.
178. Id. at 857.
179. Id. at 851. It is worth noting that it is difficult to reconcile Schor's broad
and hazy multi-factored approach with the recent spate of strict separation of powers
decisions embodied in Chadha and Bowsher. Such multi-factored tests provide little
guidance and restraint in that Congress could drum up an infinite number of
"important" purposes which, if judged under a rational basis standard, could effectively
dissolve the distinction between Article III and Article I.
180.
See, e.g., Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, 117o Then Should Judge?:

Developing the InternationalRule of Law under NAFTA Chapter 11, 2 Cl1. J. INTrL L
193, 197 (2001).
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a court subject to more congressional control, since under the IIA and

the NAFTA schemes, arbitrators are chosen by the states, and
investor and have no formal connection with Congress. 181
The next factor to be considered under Schor is the range of
jurisdiction granted to the alternative forum and, more
fundamentally,
threshold
issues
concerning
the
forum's
impartiality. 182 From one perspective, jurisdiction of the Chapter 11
tribunal is quite small since it only involves states and multinational
investors residing in Canada or Mexico. From another perspective,
however, it is massive because the state, in a certain sense, is the
aggregate of individuals and these claims may involve the very
essence of the state qua public protector. Viewed this way, the
jurisdictional grant is not narrowly tailored like jurisdictional grants
involving commodity futures trading or utility disputes. There is a
significant problem here.
Impartiality is another significant problem that arises. A well
documented phenomenon of "repeater bias" and arbitrator shopping
plagues arbitration because an arbitrators' livelihood depends on
attracting business from corporations who are the repeat players in
arbitration. 183 A corporation will not choose an arbitrator who
provides anti-business decisions. 184 Hence, this repeater bias has
been suggested to cut against arbitration's impartiality.
In sum, under Schor's multi-factored approach, it is difficult to
tell how the Court would decide. Still, one issue remains clear;
Congress cannot deny all Article III involvement. Both the IIA and
NAFTA preclude Article III review.

181.
NAFTA, supra note 36, at 642-48. With the good comes the bad, however,
and the Author believes it is not a stretch to assume that pro-business members of
Congress wanted to avoid Article III courts because of their purported litigious,
expensive, and time consuming nature. It may even be argued that certain Members of
Congress were disgruntled with the lax standard of review for state police power
actions which could throw up barriers to free trade and accumulation of property.
Thus, under these assumptions, Congress granted international arbitrators the
authority to define NAFTA's broad and open-ended definition of "property" and
"expropriation" in order to avoid perceived inefficiencies and anti-trade aspects of the
federal court system. Despite the fact that international arbitrators are not subject to
congressional control or majoritarian pressures, it would seem that such motives (if
ever proven) establish a latent separation of powers problem because Congress
arguably rewrites judge-made law through the hand of the international arbitrator.
182.
Schor,478 U.S at 851-52.
183.

BERNARD AUDIT, TRANSNATIONAL

ARBITRATION AND STATE CONTRACTS:

FINDINGS AND PROSPECTS 81 (1987); see also Lisa B. Bingham, Employment
Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 189 (1997)
(noting a sizeable gap between the success of employees with repeat player employers
and of employees with non-repeat player employers in arbitration decisions).
184.
See generally Bingham, supra note 184.
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3. Californiav. Arizona and Article III's Original Jurisdiction Clause
Another significant problem for proponents of imposed state
arbitration is Article III's Original Jurisdiction clause and California
v. Arizona amplification of it. 8 5 On this line of analysis, Article III's
language vesting original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court in cases
"in which a State shall be a party" should be reinstated if there is a
valid abrogation or waiver of the Eleventh Amendment." 6 In this
scenario, if Congress drafts a federal law that would subject the
states to suits in certain instances, and the states agree to waive
immunity, Article III's Original Jurisdiction clause for state disputes
would then be reinstated. Thus, federal courts could not be banned
from hearing these disputes.
On its face, an act of Congress forcing a claim involving a state
party to be adjudicated in anything other than a federal court
contradicts the literal language of Article III. Furthermore, Marbury
v. Madison expressly held that Congress did not have this powerCongress could neither add to nor take away from Article III's grant
87
of original jurisdiction.1
California v. Arizona provides additional guidance for this
unique situation. 188 In that case, California sued Arizona and the
United States. 8 9 For the issue of quieting title, the United States
had legitimately waived its sovereign immunity by statute. 190 The
plain language of the statute also granted federal district courts
exclusive jurisdiction over these disputes, cutting out any Supreme
Court oversight.191

185.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3; California v. Arizona. 440 U.S. 59 (1979)
(asserting that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction conferred by Article III
includes disputes between states over title to land and not only over boundaries).
186.
See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
187.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175-76 (1803). Congress does
protect the Court from being deluged by original jurisdiction cases by granting
concurrent jurisdiction to lower federal courts for some original jurisdiction cases. 28
U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)-(b) (1994). The Court acquiesced to Congress' interpretation that the
Original Jurisdiction clause permits Congress the power to grant concurrent
jurisdiction to lower federal courts. See, e.g.. Ames v. Kansas 111 U S 449, 464-65
(1884). What is crucial about concurrent jurisdiction for this Note is that it only limits
the Supreme Court from being the court of first resort. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)-(b). The
state dispute still must be adjudicated in an Article III court and the Supreme Court
still has appellate jurisdiction. Id. Unfortunately, NAFTA Chapter 11 denies all
Article EIl involvement. NAFTA, supranote 36, at 642-8.
188.
California,440 U.S. at 61-68.
189.
Id. at 61.
190.
Id. at 65.
191.
Id. at 64-68; see also 28 U.S.C.A- §§ 1346(0, 2409(a) (2001) (listing the
conditions under which federal courts may assert jurisdiction over quint tile claims in
which the United States has an interest).
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The Supreme Court agreed that Congress can waive some or
even all of the United States sovereign immunity. 192 However, in
stern language, the Court stated "once Congress has waived the
Nation's sovereign immunity, it is far from clear that it can withdraw
the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court over such suits." 19 3 To
avoid adjudicating this constitutional question, the Court stretched
the limits of statutory interpretation and read the statute in such a
way as to allow the dispute to be adjudicated originally before the
Court.

194

California v. Arizona indicates that the Court will not accept
Congressional denial of Supreme Court concurrent jurisdiction for
state disputes. 195 Arguably, NAFTA Chapter 11 does just that,
granting exclusive jurisdiction for disputes between foreign investors
and states to an international arbitration tribunal. 96 If the Original
Jurisdiction clause still has vitality, NAFTA Chapter 11 appears to be
in direct conflict with it.
In sum, at the time of NAFTA's passage, Congress may have
thought it possible to abrogate state immunity under the foreign
commerce power-though even at that time such a power was far
from apparent. 97 Even if NAFTA had followed Seminole Tribe,
Congress ought certainly to have considered the implications Chapter
11's conflict with Article III. Article III appears to deny Congress the
leverage to effectively foreclose Article III review. Northern Pipeline
does not empower Congress to send these cases to an international
arbitration tribunal; the nebulous balancing test of Schor is not much
better. Finally, nothing indicates that the Original Jurisdiction
clause is merely vestigial. Though Congress may create concurrent
jurisdiction, California v. Arizona, read broadly, holds that Congress
cannot grant exclusive jurisdiction for state disputes to a lower
Article III court-a fortiori, this bans exclusive arbitration tribunals
as well. Congress cannot abrogate state immunity or condition state
benefits on an immunity waiver, or waive Article III review;
therefore, Chapter 11 is unconstitutional.

192.
California,440 U.S. at 67.
193.
Id. at 65.
194.
Id. at 66-68.
195.
Id. at 68.
196.
NAFTA, supra note 36, at 642-48.
197.
See supra section A (noting that Seminole Tribe's overruling of Union Gas
had not occurred at the time of NAFTA's passage); see also Alfred Hill, In Defense of
Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C. L. REV. 485 (2001) (discussing the
Congressional power to abolish state sovereign immunity).
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IV. Do THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS ABSOLVE CHAPTER 11 OF ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL FAILINGS?

Because of Chapter 11's international character, this section
leaves the IIA hypothetical to examine whether the federal
government's foreign affairs powers override problems with the
NAFTA scheme. Recently, several have questioned whether the
resurgent principle of federalism now overrules watershed foreign
affairs cases like Missouri v. Holland, a classic expression of the
foreign power's incursion into state sovereignty.1 98 Others have
opined that the Supreme Court might very well be prepared to realize
that the cost of globalization and its perceived benefits leads to a
dilution of federalism. 199 This view argues that the Court would opt
for a dualist approach to the dilemma and craft a different foreign
affairs rule for federalism to ensure that Chapter 11-like-legislation
would survive. To examine if Chapter 11 falls within the scope of the
foreign affairs power, 200 four major foreign affairs cases will be used
20 1
as touchstones.
A. The PerplexingTriumvirate: United States v. Pink, CurtissWright Corporation, and Missouri v. Holland
It has long been recognized that a primary purpose of the federal
system was to create a univocal, efficient means of conducting foreign
affairs. 20 2 The foreign affairs power has both a positive and negative
component, and the treaty power has often been thought of as the

198.
See, e.g., Robert Knowles, Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court's
Answer to Globalization, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 735 (2001); Martin S. Flaherty, Are We to
be a Nation? FederalPower vs. "States' Rights"in ForeignAffairs, 70 U. COLO. L REV
1277 (1999); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and Aincrican Federalism, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 390 (1998); James A. Deeken, Note, A New Miranda for Foreign Nationals?
The Impact of Federalismon InternationalTreaties that Place Affirmatime Obligations
on State Governments in the Wake of Printz v. United States, 31 VAND. J. T55Sixr'L
L. 997 (1998); Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism
and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L.REV. 1726 (1998).
199.
See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Federalisms Future in the Global Village, 47
VAND.L. REV.1441 (1994).
200. For the sake of expediency, this Note uses the term foreign affairs power as
rubric encompassing the treaty power, Congress' foreign commerce power, and the
various distinct executive powers to recognize nations and so forth.
201. See generally Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (1986); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TILE UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996) (noting cases which allow for an analysis of whether
NAFTA Chapter 11 falls within the scope of foreign affairs power). This Note by no
means has relied on an exhaustive search of the massive corpus of secondary hterature
on this topic.
202. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 201, at 13-22.
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focal federal foreign affairs power. 20 3 Without a doubt, the treaty
power significantly lessens the states' role. In fact, the only positive
state check on the federal foreign affairs power is the Senate
supermajority requirement.
The popularity of congressionalexecutive agreements with fast track approval as a treaty substitute
20 4
has thoroughly eroded even this minimal check.
On the other hand, there are two significant negative checks on
states involvement in foreign affairs. The first includes the much
cited ban on state international compacts. 20 5
Perhaps most
intriguing of late, is the Supreme Court's recent holding that
Congress' foreign commerce power has a dormant component. 20 6
Despite these general principles outlining the power, the
Framers may have kept the scope of the foreign affairs powers
intentionally vague in order to quell dissent.
During the
Constitution's ratification, the Federalists made assurances that the
federal government's various foreign affairs powers were limited in
scope. 207 A well-noted debate occurred during the Virginia Ratifying
Convention, where anti-Federalist argued that the inclusion of a
20 8
treaty power would diminish states' rights.
Federalist countered that the proposed treaty power had limits.
Edmund Randolph stated, "neither the life nor property of any citizen,
nor the particular right of any state can be affected by a treaty. '20 9
James Madison reassured the Virginia Ratifying Convention that the
purpose of the treaty power is "the regulation of intercourse with
foreign nations and is external. '210 Though not a part of these debates,
Jefferson as Vice President and President of the Senate, repeated this
assumed limitation when he wrote, "[the] President and Senate cannot
do by treaty what the whole government is interdicted from doing in
any way."2 11 Perhaps to the satisfaction of both states' rights

203.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
204.
See generally Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?,
108 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1995) (tracking the evolution of the congressional-executive
agreement and confronting the debate that NAFTA should have been a treaty and not
a congressional-executive agreement requiring a simple majority).
205.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10.
206.
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 371 (2000).
207.
NOTES OF JAMES MADISON (Sept. 8, 1787), reprinted in 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 548 (Max Ferrand ed., 1911).
208.
THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
reprinted in 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 506-14

(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1987).
209.
Id. at 504.
210.
Id. at 514.
211.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE: FOR THE
USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, reprinted in JEFFERSON'S PARLIAMENTARY

WRITINGS 421 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1988).
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power remained
advocates and nationalists, the scope of the treaty 212
largely undefined throughout the nineteenth century.
In the first part of the twentieth century, three very challenging
and enigmatic cases, Missouri v. Holland, United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., and United States v. Pink destroyed this uneasy
One commentator described
peace brokered by ambiguity. 213
Missouri v. Holland as "perhaps the most famous and most discussed
case in the constitutional law of foreign affairs," eventually spawning
the rn-fated Bricker Amendment's cantankerous attempt to tie the
2 14
treaty power to the federal government's enumerated powers.
Many have noted that Curtiss-Wright has been subjected to
"withering criticism." 215 Likewise, United States v. Pink caused
significant dissent because the Court appeared to allow executive
agreements to run roughshod over the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
2
of unconstitutional takings of property.

1.

United States v. Pink:

16

State Law Trumped by Executive

Agreement
United States v. Pink is often used to probe the extent of the
Executive's power to make international agreements. 2 17 From the
standpoint of this Note what is more interesting about Pink is the
collision of state policy and common law decisions vrith an
international agreement. 218 Pink involved a dispute over ownership
of Russian assets located in New York. 21 9 By nationalizing the entire
insurance industry after the revolution, the Soviets intended to bring
Russian assets located outside the USSR vithin their reach.220 Both
the government of New York and her courts refused to recognize the
Soviet nationalizations effect on assets located in New York.221 In a
quid pro quo formalization of state relations between the Soviets and
the United States, the Soviets released U.S. assets located in Russia
and assigned the rights to their U.S.-based assets to the federal

212. Bradley, supra note 198, at 418-22.
213. See generally United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416
(1920).
HENKIN, supra note 201, at 190.
214.
215. See, eg., Bradley, supra note 198, at 438.
216. See, eg., A. Mark Weisburd, Due ProcessLimits on Federal Extraterritorial
Legislation?,35 COLUM. J. TRANSNA'L L. 379, 398 (1997).
217. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional
Regime ofForeignRelations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 120 (1999).
218. Pink, 315 U.S. at 210-11.
219. Id.
220.

Id.

221.

Id. at 217.
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government in order that it might procure these assets for the
222
Soviets.
After President Roosevelt agreed to recognize the Soviet's claim
and the United States procurement of these assets, New York
continued her policy of non-recognition. 223
In the dispute that
followed, Justice Douglas opined that "a treaty is a 'Law of the Land'
under the supremacy clause . . .of the Constitution" to which both
state law and policy must yield. 224 The Court held that the United
States had priority over all other creditors and adeptly avoided
deciding the more troubling question of whether U.S. priority is a de
225
facto taking under the Fifth Amendment.
2. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: Separation of
Powers Doctrine Diluted in the International Context
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation addresses
the relationship between the separation of powers doctrine and the
foreign affairs power.2 26 Even in an era when the Supreme Court
strictly construed the separation of powers, the Court in CurtissWright quite willingly recognized the breadth of the Executive's reach
in conducting foreign affairs. 227
The Supreme Court upheld
Congress' delegation of power to the President, allowing him the
discretion to prohibit and prosecute sales of munitions to Bolivia and
Paraguay. This was permitted despite the fact that such a delegation
was tantamount to the Executive both making and enforcing the law,
an anathema in the domestic sphere. This is an especially striking
move for a Court that had yet to fully accept the constitutionality of
228
the administrative state.
Along with blending Article I and Article II, Justice Sutherland
found a unique source for the federal government's foreign affairs
powers by looking past the enumerated powers of the Constitution to
the very nature of sovereignty itself.2 29 The opinion states that, after
independence, Sovereignty passed not to the colonies themselves "but
to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the United
States of America. '2 30 Sovereignty is not granted to the colonies per
se-at least in foreign affairs context-but to the Union. 3 1 With
sovereignty placed in the Union and not in the states, the principal of

222.
223.
224.
225.
226,
227.
228.
229,
230.
231.

Id. at 212-13.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 234.
Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 315.
Id. at 321.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id. at 317.
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state sovereignty has little limiting influence on the scope of the
232
foreign affairs power.
3. Missouri v. Holland: Expansion of Congressional Power via
Treaty-Making
In Missouri v. Holland the sovereignty of the states collided with
the sovereignty of the United States. 2 33 Missouri confronted the
unique question of whether Congress, via the treaty power, could
regulate an area, in this instance regulation of migratory birds,
4
where Congress' commerce power ostensibly did not reach.2
Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes dismissed the argument that
the treaty-making power is limited to "what an act of Congress could
not do unaided."23 5 Nonetheless, the extension of the treaty power
beyond the commerce power does not mean it is unlimited. Justice
Holmes examined whether both the Constitution's "prohibitory
words" and its "invisible radiations" denied Congress the power to
236
act.
Following Holmes' method, the first crucial question is whether
international action will "contravene any prohibitory words to be
found in the Constitution."237 Examining Chapter 11 against the
literal prohibitory words of the Eleventh Amendment, Chapter 11
does not contravene this literal jurisdictional requirement. 3 8
Along with analyzing the prohibitory words of the Constitution,
Justice Holmes also examined whether the Constitution's "invisible
radiations" prohibited the act in question. 239 Adopting a functional
approach, Justice Holmes found that the Constitution did not provide
the states with an absolute right over and against the national
government to regulate "transitory" property.2 40
Subjecting Chapter 11 to functional analysis and noting the
expansive reach of state sovereign immunity adopted by the current
Court, the invisible radiations of the Eleventh Amendment explicitly
conflicts with Chapter 11 because Congress ignored state sovereign
immunity and created a cause of action against the states. 2 4 1 It is
irrelevant that the action is pursued in international arbitration

232.

Id.

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Missouri,252 U.S. at 431.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 433-34.
Id. at 433.
U.S CONST. amend. XI.
Missouri, 252 U.S. at 434.
Id. at 435.
NAFTA, supranote 36, at 642.
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rather than federal court; sovereign immunity has been breached
through the creation of a cause of action against the states. 2A2
Justice Holmes' dicta that treaties do not violate either the
prohibitory words or invisible radiations in the Constitution
eventually received the Court's imprimatur in Reid v. Covert.2 43 In

an oft-quoted passage, Justice Black stated, "no agreement with a
foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on another
branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution." 2A4 In Reid, the Supreme Court held that the President
245
could not contract away Sixth Amendment rights of a U.S. citizen.
Stated aptly by Louis Henkin, Reid indicates that the foreign
affairs power is
subject to other radiations from the separation of powers. It has been
stated that a treaty cannot increase, diminish, or redistribute the
constitutional powers of the branches of the federal government or
delegate them to others-say, the power of Congress to declare war or
the President's command of American Forces, or a court's exercise of
2 46
judicialpower.

Despite the fact that Reid dealt with individual rights as opposed to
states' rights, Henkin's intuition that Reid has implications
24 7
concerning separation of powers has merit.
Regarding Chapter 11, the crucial question that this triumvirate
of cases raises is what are the outer limits on the foreign affairs
powers. Following Pink, state statutory and common law apparently
can be trumped by foreign executive agreement. 248 According to
Curtiss-Wright, the vitality of the separation of powers doctrine is
lessened in an international context.249 Finally, Missouri holds
Congress can regulate the states by way of treaty where Congress
250
could not do so otherwise.
Case law delineating the limitations to the foreign affairs power
is scant. In Reid, Congress cannot by way of treaty lessen an
individual's Sixth Amendment rights, and as Louis Henkin argued,
this has implications for the separation of powers doctrine as well.
Hence, the real question is whether Missouri v. Holland survives or is
significantly limited by the recent spate of federalism cases like
Seminole Tribe and Alden v. Maine. These cases can be read to
suggest that the distinction between individual rights and states'
242.
243.
244.
245.

See, e.g., Missouri, 252 U.S. at 434-35.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 19.
246.
Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 148-50 (1st ed.
1972) (emphasis added).
247.

Id.

248.
249.
250.

Pink, 315 U.S. at 229-34.
Curtiss-Wright,299 U.S. at 318-22.
Missouri, 252 U.S. at 416.
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rights no longer exists. 25 1 If the commonality between states and
persons is great, analogy to Reid suggests that the federal
government cannot deny via an executive agreement a state's
2 52
Eleventh Amendment or Article III rights.
B. The Dames & Moore Decisionas Precedent
Because Dames & Moore involves the intersection of
expropriation claims and Article III, its facts may be the closest to the
current Chapter 11 situation. 253 Furthermore, the Supreme Court in
Dames & Moore arguably affirmed the Executive and Legislative'
power to contract away access to Article III courts.ns5 While the
foreign affairs power does hold some sway over Article III, there is a
clear analytic problem in extending Dames & Moore to Chapter 11.
Dames & Moore does not concern the abrogation of state sovereign
immunity, nor implicate foreign investors, but involves U.S. nationals
255
investing internationally.
The Dames & Moore case resulted from President Carter's
Executive Order suspending outstanding claims against Iranian
interests in all American courts.25 6 In the challenged action, the

251.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 733 (1999); Sherry, supra note 144, at 1126
(noting how Justice Kennedy turns to individual rights to defend the concept of State
sovereign immunity).
Reid, 354 U.S. at 19. Though there is no support for this argument except
252.
the very general language in Article IV, it is still worth pondering. Article IV, § 4
states "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government." Arguably, such a removal power granted to foreign citizens for
challenging traditional state police power actions violates the Constitution's guarantee
As noted before,
that the states shall have a republican form of government.
California's action was a run of the mill health and safety action. If California has to
worry about lawsuits-S1.6 billion in this case-significantly upsetting the public
finances when creating health and safety policy, California fails to represent and
protect its citizens. Note also that if this action involved a small state like Montana,
the damages requested by Methanex would effectively wipe out the entire state budget
for at least one year-a calamity that would make the small state government look
more like a third world country.
Granted, United States v. Pink indicates that when state policy and common law
collide with an executive agreement, the executive agreement has priority. However, if
the executive agreement in question contravenes the prohibitory words of the
Constitution, abrogates state immunity, or denies a republican form of government,
then the Pink precedent has no weight. A removal power couched in the panglossian
belief of the wealth maximizing nature of free trade did not just ignore state policy or
overrule common law, it breached state immunity and created substantive investor
checklveto power on state legislative action hampering the democratic process. By
opening states up to such suits, Congress fails to guarantee a republic form of
government and has covertly bargained away a large portion of public control over its
own safety to the investment and market spheres of society.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 684-85 (1981).
253.
254.
Id. at 680.
255.
Id.
Id. at 663.
256.
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Supreme Court held that the President had the authority to suspend
all court claims and refer them to an ad hoc Iran-United States claim
tribunal, which would deal with each claim individually through the
application of international law. 257 Though the Court did not hold
that this power is plenary, it held the action constitutional because
the Court inferred a grant of power from Congress to the President in
258
the structure of the IIEPA.
Though affirming this broad exercise of executive power based on
congressional inference, the Dames & Moore Court explicitly
"emphasized the narrowness of their decision. ' 259 In other words,
only when such a settlement is crucial to the resolution of a major
foreign policy dispute will the Court construe the Executive's power
so broadly. 260 It is also important to note that there is a long
tradition permitting the federal government to settle claims of its
citizens against foreign sovereignties. 26' Clearly, the agreement to
create the Iran-United States Claims tribunal fits within this
tradition.
The presidential and congressional power to suspend claims
against a foreign state in an international incident of magnitude and
refer them to international arbitration is wholly different from
abrogating state immunity for ordinary foreign investment and
restricting review to an international arbitration tribunal. Chapter
11 involves takings claims by a foreign citizen against one of the fifty
states recognized under the foreign commerce power. Dames &
Moore involved claims of U.S. nationals in domestic courts against a
foreign sovereignty-the inverse of Chapter 11.262
The federal government can negotiate on behalf of states in
claims by foreign nationals against the state itself. This ability to
negotiate, however, cannot involve abrogating state immunity or
commanding the states to enter an international arbitration tribunal
without, at the very least, Article III oversight. 263 Not only does this
raise an issue of state immunity, in this unique instance it would
appear that the state has a right to Article III review, a right
Congress denied. Dames & Moore provides little precedent for
justifying Chapter 1l's unique scheme.

257.
Id. at 684-85.
258.
Id. at 686.
259.
Id. at 688.
260.
See, e.g., Lee R. Marks & John C. Grabow, The President's Foreign
Economic Powers After Dames & Moore v. Regan: Legislation by Acquiescence, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 68, 101 (1982) (arguing that such a limitation is inadequate).
261.
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 679-80.
262.
Id. at 663.
263.
Id. at 684-85.
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V. CONCLUSION

It is appropriate to end where this Note began, by highlighting
the Supreme Court's strong revival of federalism. In Alden v. Maine,
Justice Kennedy stated that no Article I power can abrogate state
sovereign immunity-this certainly must include Congress' Article I
foreign commerce power underlying Chapter 11.264 Adding to this
clear rule, Alden furthered strengthened state immunity by also
grounding it in the very structure of the Constitution.2 65 Justice
Kennedy held that the Eleventh Amendment "acted not to change but
to restore the original constitutional design."266 By opening the
states up to suit, Chapter 11 treats "these sovereign entities as mere
267
prefectures or corporations."
Under the Supreme Court's current interpretation of state
sovereign immunity, it is doubtful that the treaty power can abrogate
state immunity in the Chapter 11 context. Certainly the strong
revival of federalism resting on its expanded foundation poses a
formidable barrier to finding the treaty power to be another avenue
for abrogating state immunity. Leaving open the question of the
treaty power, a congressional-executive agreement passed under fast
track-a latent line-item veto power-and the foreign commerce
power should fail to overcome this revised and strengthened
federalism.
It is troubling that the legion of NAFTA attorney negotiators and
volumes of legislative history failed to consider any of these problems.
Some would argue that this indicates the veracity of what those on
the left would have us believe: NAFTA is the progeny of an insatiable
Wall Street vis-A-vis the duplicitous consent manufacturers on K
Street. Though such a thesis is an oversimplification, Chapter 11
breaches state immunity through international arbitration in lieu of
any Article III oversight and can effectively hamstring legitimate
state police power actions. With this new check on state police power
actions, breach of state immunity, and express avoidance of Article
III oversight, one does wonder how this is anything other than
political pork for the international investor class.
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